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QUANTITY DISCOUNTS UNDER
THE CLAYTON ACT
by
JOHN E. O'NEILL*
&
THOMAS E. O'NEILLt
The suppression of price discrimination through the granting of
quantity discounts has been a major problem of the Federal Trade Com-
mission since the passage of the original Clayton Act, on October 15,
1914.' Although much progress has been made in the past thirty-nine
years in curbing this type of unfair trade practice, price discrimination is
still rampant in many lines of commerce. The Supreme Court has clari-
fied the powers of the Commission in this field from time to time, with
beneficial results, but has also placed stumbling-blocks in its path of
progress. We shall review here the progress made by the Commission
in suppressing price discriminations through quantity discounts, and more
particularly, the difficult enforcement problems presently confronting
the Commission under recent decisions of the Supreme Court.
The original Clayton Act, supplementing existing laws against un-
lawful restraints and monopolies, was directed against price discrimina-
tions granted by sellers to their competing customers. The Act, however,
contained a proviso that "discrimination in price.. . on account of differ-
ences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold," should not
be unlawful. This proviso of the original Act was construed to permit
quantity discounts without regard to the amount of the sellers' actual
savings in cost resulting from quantity deliveries,' with a resulting con-
tinuance of price discriminations.
This gave rise to the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act of June
19, 1936.' The purpose of the Act, as outlined in the House Committee
Report,' was to amend the Clayton Act in such manner as to limit "the
use of quantity price differentials to the sphere of actual cost differences."
This purpose is expressed in Section 2 (a) of the amended Clayton Act
as follows:
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349 Stat. 1526 (1936).
6 H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936).
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or
any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.
With the passage of the Robinson-Patman amendments the Fed-
eral Trade Commission instituted a flood of price discrimination investi-
gations against sellers, and in the first four years the law was in effect,
the Commission docketed sixty-eight price discrimination cases.' These
proceedings fell into several categories: (1) simple price discriminations
involving outright price preferences to some customers, not disguised
by discounts, delivery terms, customer classification or other devices, (2)
discounts granted on quantity purchases in excess of demonstrable savings
in the cost of manufacture, sales or delivery, (3) cumulative discounts
on the aggregate business done over a given period of time, (4) dis-
crimination through classification of customers according to size of po-
tential purchases, (5) discrimination against competing retailers, through
reduced prices to wholesalers who also sell at retail, i.e., "functional dis-
counts", and (6) discrimination through absorbtion of freight and de-
livery costs, i.e., the "basing point cases".
Through the intervening years price discrimination cases have rep-
resented a substantial part of the Federal Trade Commission activity.
In the Annual Report of the Commission for the fiscal year ended June
30, 1949, it was stated at p. 31, "Price discrimination, in violation of
Section 2 (a), continued to be the most frequent charge involved in in-
vestigations under this Act." It is little wonder then, that the courts
have been called upon so often in the past seventeen years to interpret
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act and to determine what constitutes a
discrimination in price "between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality" which tends to lessen, injure, prevent or
destroy competition.
WHAT Is A "DISCRIMINATION IN PRICE"
In Moss v. Federal Trade Commission' it was held that a price
58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 507 (1940).
6 148 F. 2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), cart. denied 326 U. S. 743 (1947).
differential in itself constitutes a "discrimination in price" where the
resulting competitive injury is between competitive sellers.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Company7 the Supreme
Court held:
We think that the language of the Act, and the legislative history just cited,
show that Congress meant by using the words "discrimination in price" in
paragraph 2 that in a case involving competitive injury between a seller's
customers the Commission need only prove that a seller had charged one pur-
chaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged one or more of the
purchaser's competitors. (italics supplied)
In Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Company' the Supreme
Court set down a further criterion for determining when a discrimination
occurs:
No single transaction can constitute a discrimination in price. At least two
transactions must take place. Thus, a contract may be made which has no
present legal defect under the Robinson-Patman Act, but a week later another
sale may be made at a different price or at a different discount, and the latter
taken into consideration with the former may establish a discrimination.
PROTECTION OF COMPETING SELLERS
FROM PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The original Clayton Act was used primarily as an adjunct to the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and was designed to prevent competing sellers
from destroying one another competitively through the granting of price
concessions to their customers. This course of action was consistent with
the whole theory of unfair trade legislation in effect up to 1938. The
underlying purpose of the original Federal Trade Commission Act,'
effective September 26, 1914, was to "prevent unfair methods of compe-
tition in commerce." 10
Competing sellers of goods, rather than their customers, were the
users of Interstate Commerce channels and, generally speaking, their
customers were not in commerce and were not even in competition with
one another. The original Clayton Act of 1914, however, failed even
in its limited objective of preventing competing sellers from destroying
one another competitively, through price discrimination, because, (a)
it allowed unlimited and unrestricted quantity discounts, regardless of
cost savings, and (b) the whole system of retail merchandising changed,
with marked effect upon competition between sellers.
Chain stores replaced local independent retailers and expanded
their operations to the point where retail chains became larger enter-
7334 U. S. 37 (1948).
8330 U. S. 743 (1947).
938 Star. 717 (1914).
10 The jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission was extended to cover "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce" by the Act of March 21, 1938, 52 Star. 111.
prises than the manufacturers who supplied them. These chain stores
demanded large price concessions and played one source of supply against
another to the point where individual suppliers, in order to gain large
retail accounts, or hold them, made discriminatory price concessions,
often secret, with resulting serious injury to their competitors. The de-
struction of competition at the source of supply was thus accelerated by
the chain store movement as is well illustrated in the Goodyear Tire and
Rubber" case, wherein secret price discriminations as high as 40% were
granted to the Sears-Roebuck Company on tire sales.
This situation gave impetus to the passage of the Robinson-Patman
Act and it was not until after the Act was passed that any effective action
was taken to curtail price discrimination. Although the vast majority of
cases under Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act deal with injury
to competing customers of the seller, i.e., large buyers versus small buyers,
some cases have arisen under the Act which have the old anti-trust
flavor, i.e., large sellers against small sellers. An example of such a case
is Mueller & Company v. Federal Trade Commiision." Here the seller,
by discriminating against other general trade areas in favor of the area
in which his competitor operated, was able to force a price so low in
the competitor's area that the competitor could not meet its competition.
Cases in this category, of course, represent clear cut violations of the
Robinson-Patman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, and they
have arisen infrequently in recent years.
PROTECTING COMPETING BUYERS FROM THE SELLERS'
PRICE DISCRIMINATIONS
The focus in recent years has been more and more centered upon
the elimination of price discriminations where the competitive injury
is between a seller's customers, rather than between him and his com-
petitors. This is consistent with the primary objective of Section 2 (a) of
the Clayton Act.'" Cases of price discrimination which have arisen under
Section 2 (a) fall into various categories including: (a) discrimination
through freight equalization or reduced delivery charges,1" (b) straight
price cutting, 5 and (c) the granting of quantity discounts. For the
purposes of this article we shall treat in detail only those price dis-
criminations which fall into the category of "quantity discounts". The
11 See note 2 supra.
12 142 F. 2d 511 (6th Cit. 1944).
13 Sen. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935).
1"American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, 187 F. 2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied
342 U. S. 875 (1951); American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F. 2d 38 (8th
Cir. 1951); Corn Products Refining Co. v. F. T. C., 324 U. S. 726 (1945).
'
5 1. T. C. v. Standard Brands, 189 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951).
quantity discount cases are the leading cases involving the interpretation
of Section 2 (a) as applied to price discriminations between competing
buyers. They emphasize the need for protecting the small buyer from
his chain store competitor.
The leading case in this category is Federal Trade Commission v.
Morton Salt Company." Morton's price schedule ranged from $1.35 to
$1.60 per case of salt, depending on the volume of purchases, but only
5 % of its customers, all chain stores, ever bought sufficient salt to obtain
the $1.35 price. As a result, the chain store buyers were able to sell
the salt at retail cheaper than wholesale purchasers from Morton could
reasonably sell the same brand of salt to independently operated retail
stores which were in competition with the chain stores.
In holding this to be a discrimination in price within the meaning
of the Act, the Supreme Court said:
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear
that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a
competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyers'
quantity purchasing ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive
a large buyer of such advantages except to the extent that a lower price could
be justified by reason of a seller's diminished costs .... 17
The issue was raised that the Federal Trade Commission had failed
to show that Morton's discriminatory discounts had in fact caused injury
to competition. In disposing of this issue the Court held:
. . . the statute does not require the Commission to find that injury has
actually resulted. The Statute requires no more than that the effect of the
prohibited price discriminations may be substantially to lessen competition
.. 18 (italics supplied)
The Supreme Court further held:
Since there was evidence sufficient to show that the less-than-carload purchasers
might have been handicapped in competing with the more favored carload
purchasers by the differential in price established by respondent the Com-
mission was justified in finding that competition might have thereby been
substantially lessened or have been injured within the meaning of the Act.' 9
(italics supplied)
As to what constitutes a price discrimination which "may" or "might
have" lessened competition, the Court cited with approval its own opinion
in Corn Products v. Federal Trade Commission," where it was held that
the Statute does not require that discriminations must in fact have
16 See note 7 supra.
17 Id. at 43.
18 Id. at 46.
'Old. at 49.
20324 U. S. 726 (1945).
harmed competition but only that there be a reasonable "possibility"
that they may have had such effect.2
In American Can Company v. Bruce's Juices22 it was likewise held
that the seller's quantity price, discount schedule and classification of
customers into three arbitrary groups for discount purposes, according to
volume of purchases, discriminated against smaller purchasers. The court
went on to say that the seller's quantity price was not based on actual
differences in sales cost, but constituted price discrimination between
large and small purchasers.
Qualification of the Morton Rule
The broad rule laid down in the Morton case as to sellers' liability
for price discriminations is qualified by the later case of Standard Oil Com-
pany v. Federal Trade Commission." In this action the Federal Trade
Commission challenged the right of the Standard Oil Company, under
the Robinson-Patman Act, to sell gasoline to four comparatively large
jobbers in the Detroit area at a price less per gallon than it sold like
gasoline to many small service stations in the same area.
The company's defense was that its lower price to jobbers was made
in good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor. The Commis-
sion found that each jobber was selling at retail, as well as wholesale,
in competition with the smaller service stations with a resulting injury
to competition. The Commission concluded as a matter of law that it
was not material under the circumstances whether the discriminations
in price granted to the four jobbers were made to meet equally low
prices of competitors and made no findings in this regard. The Com-
mission held that even though the lower prices may have been made by
the respondent in good faith to meet the lower prices of competitors,
this does not constitute a defense in the face of affirmative proof that
the effect of the discrimination was to injure, destroy or prevent competi-
tion with the retail stations operated by the four jobbers and with sta-
tions operated by their retailer-customers.
The Court held, in a five to three opinion, that Congress did not in-
tend "either to abolish competition or so radically curtail it that a seller
would have no substantial right to self-defense against a price raid by
a competitor."24 The court thereupon reversed the Circuit Court of Ap-
21 Ibid. This holding of the Court was vehemently criticized in the minority opinion
of Justice Jackson in which Justice Frankfurter concurred: "I think the law as written
by the Congress and as always interpreted by this court requires that the records show a
reasonable probability of that effect. The difference, as every lawyer knows, is not
unimportant and in many cases would be decisive .... The law rarely authorizes judg-
ments on proof of mere possibilities."
22 187 F. 2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951).
22340 U. S. 231 (1951).
241d. at 249.
peals and remanded the case with instructions to the Federal Trade Com-
mission to make findings of fact on the question of seller's "good faith"
in meeting a lawful and equally low price of its competitor. 5
PROTECTION OF THE SELLER FROM THE BUYER
The original Clayton Act was directed solely against the seller
granting a price discrimination." It was not until the passage of the
Robinson-Patman Act that proceedings could be instituted also against
buyers who knowingly induced or received discriminatory prices. Section
2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act imposed this new liability upon
the buyer in the following language:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section. (italics supplied)
Thereupon it became no more blessed to receive than to give. For
several years, however, the Federal Trade Commission directed its ener-
gies in price discrimination cases primarily against the seller rather than
the buyer under the apparent and perhaps well founded assumption that
the seller is the prime offender and without his acquiescence there could
be no price discrimination. Since the Robinson-Patman Act was passed,
however, the Federal Trade Commission has proceeded in nineteen
cases 27 against the buyers of assorted merchandise, charging in each case
that the buyer violated Section 2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act by
knowingly inducing or receiving a discrimination in price. In all of
these cases the Commission proceeded on the theory that the buyer's
liability under Section 2 (f) was identical with the seller's liability under
Section 2 (a), and that consequently, in each case the Commission estab-
lished its prima facie case merely by proving that the buyer received
goods from the seller at a lower price than the seller charged for like
goods sold to the buyer's competitors.
25 Id. at 267, the minority said: "We believe that good faith meeting of a com-
petitor's price only rebuts the prima facie case of violation established by showing the price
discrimination. Whether the proven price discrimination is of a character that violates
Section 2 (a) then becomes a matter for the determination of the Commission on a
showing that there may be injury to competition."
20 H. Rep. 627, 63d. Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).27 In matter of Bird & Sons, Mont. Ward, 25 F. T. C. 547 (1937); In matter of Golf
Ball Mfg. Assn., 26 F. T. C. 824 (1938); In matter of Miami Wholesale Drug Corp.,
28 F. T. C. 485 (1939); In matter of American Oil Co. & Gen. Finance, 29 F. T. C.
857 (1939); In matter of A. S. Aloe Co., 34 F. T. C. 363 (1941); In matter of Atlantic
City Wholesale Drug Co., 38 F. T. C. 631 (1944): In matter of E. J. Brach & Sons,
39 F. T. C. 535 (1944); In matter of Assoc. Merchandising Corp., 40 F. T. C. 578 (1945);
In matter of Curtis Candy Co., F. T. C. dkts 4556 & 4673; In matter of Crown Zellerbach
Corp., F. T. C. dkt 5421; In matter of Sylvania Electric Products, F. T. C. dkt 5728;
In matter of National Tea Co., F. T. C. dkt 5648; In matter of Namco Inc.. F. T. C.
dkt 5771; In matter of Atlas Supply Co., F. T. C. dkt 5794; In matter of Metro. Auto
Wholesalers Coop., F. T. C. dkts 5720-5724; In matter of Safeway Stores, F. T. C. dkt
5990; In matter of Kroger Co., F. T. C. dkt 5991; In matter of Automatic Canteen Co.,
F. T. C. dkt 4933; In matter of Window Glass Mfgrs. Assn., F. T. C. dkt 3154.
In none of these cases under Section 2 (f) did the Commission at-
tempt to prove that the purchaser accepted a discriminatory price with
knowledge that the lower price to him was not justified by the sellers'
cost savings. It was assumed, in other words, that the prima facie rule
laid down by the Supreme Court in the Morton28 case, with respect to the
seller's liability under Section 2 (a), was equally applicable to cases
arising under Section 2 (f) where buyers were charged with inducing
price discriminations.
The rude awakening came with the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of Automatic Canteen Company v. Federal Trade Commission."
This is the only case, which has reached the higher courts, involving a
review of the Federal Trade Commission's action against buyers under
Section 2 (f). In the Automatic Canteen case the Commission intro-
duced evidence that the petitioner received, and in some instances solicited,
prices which it knew were as much as 33% lower than prices quoted
other purchasers. The Commission did not proceed further and attempt
to show that the price differentials received by the petitioner exceeded any
cost savings which the sellers may have enjoyed by reason of the large
volume of sales made to the petitioner.
In reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals and remanding the case
to the Federal Trade Commission the Supreme Court observed:
The Commission made no finding negativing the existence of cost savings or
stating that whatever cost savings there were did not at least equal price
differentials petitioner may have received. It did not make any findings as
to petitioner's knowledge of actual cost savings to particular sellers, and found
only as to knowledge, that petitioner knew what the list prices of other buyers
were.
2 0
The Court went on to point out that a buyer is not precluded from
inducing a lower price based on cost differences that would provide the
seller with a defense under Section 2 (a) to a charge of price discrimina-
tion. Consequently, a prima facie case was not made by the Federal
Trade Commission by merely proving the price discrimination without
also going on to prove that the buyer who induced or received the price
discrimination knew that the seller could not justify it upon his cost
savings resulting from quantity sales.
Thus, the Federal Trade Commission is placed in the anomalous
position of assuming one burden of proof in proceedings against sellers
of merchandise under Section 2 (a), and an entirely different and seem-
ingly impossible burden of proof in proceedings against buyers of mer-
chandise under Section 2 (f).
28 See note 7 supra.
29 346 U. S. 61 (1953).
30 Id. at 66, 67.
In cases against sellers, the rule recited in the Morton case applies
and a prima facie case for the Federal Trade Commission is made upon
the mere proof that prices charged by the respondent were lower to
some of his customers than to others. In cases under Section 2 (f)
against the buyer, however, it is necessary under the rule recited in the
Automatic Canteen case to prove not only that the prices charged the
respondent buyer were less than those charged to his competitor, but
also that the respondent buyer knew that the prices charged him could
not be justified by the seller's reduced costs on quantity sales. The Com-
mission must prove, therefore, under Section 2 (f), not only a state
of facts spelling out a solicited price discrimination, but also the opera-
tion of the buyer's mind."
The effect of this decision was to throw a wrench into the efforts
of the Federal Trade Commission to reach large quantity buyers, under
Section 2 (f), who have been exerting pressures on the sellers for price
discriminations. From a practical standpoint the decision seems to nullify
Section 2 (f). Large buyers were the target at which the Robinson-
Patman Act was aimed, but in view of the new burden of proof rule
the target has been missed. In seeking to counteract the pressures exerted
by the large buyers to obtain price discriminations through quantity dis-
counts, the Commission now finds itself in approximately the same posi-
tion that it occupied back in 1936 before the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act. It is only in an extreme case that the Commission will be
able to come forward with the necessary proof that buyers are inducing
and receiving price discriminations and are also aware that these price
discriminations are not justified by the seller's reduced costs. Since the
decision in the Automatic Canteen case, the Commission has found it
necessary to dismiss several pending cases under Section 2 (f) for lack
of proof of knowledge."2
NEW PROBLEMS IN PROCEEDING AGAINST BUYERS
UNDER SECTION 2 (f)
The question arises as to what course of action remains open to
the Federal Trade Commission in its efforts to stop chain store buyers
81 Id. at 85. The minority opinion of Justices Douglas, Black and Reed takes issue
with the majority on what constitutes a prima facie case under Section 2 (f) : "The Court's
construction not only requires the Commission to show that the price discriminations were
not justified; it also makes the Commission prove what lay in the buyer's mind. I would
let the acts of the buyer speak for themselves. Where, as here, the buyer undertakes to
bludgeon sellers into prices that give him a competitive advantage, there is no unfairness
in making him show that the privileges he demanded had cost justifications. This buyer
over and again held itself out as a cost expert. I would hold it to its professions."
82 1 matter of Crown Zellerbach, F. T. C. dkt 5421, dismissed July 27, 1953;
In matter of Saleway Stores, F. T. C. dkt 5990, dismissed August 3, 1953; In matter of
Kroger Co., F. T. C. dkt 5991, dismissed Sept. 25, 1953.
from soliciting or receiving price discriminations which are not justified
by the seller's cost differentials. There would seem to be three possible
avenues of approach:
(1) Section 2 (f) of the Clayton Act might be amended by striking
out the word "knowingly" with the result that a prima facie case of
price discrimination will be made by the Federal Trade Commission
under Section 2 (f) against buyers upon the mere introduction of proof
that the price charged to one buyer is less than the price charged to his
competitor for the same goods. This change would have the effect of
shifting the burden to the buyer of showing that the reduced price
which he solicited or accepted was justified by the seller's cost savings.
(2) The Commission might attempt to assume the burden of proof
imposed upon it in the Automatic Canteen case by attempting to show
not only the price discrimination under Section 2 (f), but also that the
recipient of the price discrimination knew that it was not justified by the
seller's cost savings. The Supreme Court in the Automatic Canteen8
case makes it look somewhat easy for the Federal Trade Commission to
assume this burden of proof:
The Commission, need only to show, in order to establish its prima facie
case, that the buyer knew that the methods by which he was served, and
quantities in which he purchased were the same as in the case of his com-
petitor. If the methods or quantities differ, the Commission must only show
that such differences could not give rise to sufficient savings in the cost of
manufacture, sale or delivery, to justify the price differential, and that the
buyer, knowing these were the only differences, should have known that they
could not give rise to sufficient cost savings. (italics supplied)
The recent action of the Federal Trade Commission in dismissing pending
2 (f) cases against Safeway, Kroger, and other buyers, indicates that
only in the most obvious cases will the Commission attempt to carry this
burden of proof as to the operation of the buyer's mind.
(3) The Supreme Court suggests another possible approach to the
problem, namely, that the seller and the buyer be joined in the same
proceeding. In its decision in the Automatic Canteen"' case the Court
said:
Indeed, though it is of course not for us to enter the domain of the Com-
mission's discretion in such matters, the Commission may in many instances
find it not inconvenient to join the offending seller in the proceedings.
It has been the general policy of the Commission not to join the seller
and the buyer in one proceeding and there are on record only four cases
where this has been done. " It seems even less likely that buyers and
83 See note 29 supra, at 80.
84 See note 29 supra, at 79.
3 In matter of Golf Ball Mfgrs. Assn., 26 F. T. C. 824 (1938); In matter of
American Oil Co. & Gen. Finance, 29 F. T. C. 857 (1939); In matter of Bird & Sons,
Mont. Ward, 25 F. T. C. 547 (1937); In matter of Atlas Supply Co., F. T. C. dkt 5794.
sellers will be joined in the same proceeding in the future because of
the different burden of proof which the Commission must now assume
in cases under Section 2 (f). Reasons for not joining the buyer and
seller are stated rather effectively in the brief of the Federal Trade Com-
mission in the Automatic Canteen case before the Supreme Court at
page 26:
The anomaly is most clearly shown in a proceeding in which the seller and
buyer were joined, the former being charged with granting certain discrimina-
tions in price in violation of Section 2 (a) and the latter with having know-
ingly induced and received the same discriminations in violation of Section
2 (f). Assume that in such a proceeding the Commission successfully
established the existence of all the elements required under the Morton Salt
case; that the buyer induced these discriminations in price knowing the pres-
ence of those elements; and that neither the seller nor the buyer made any
defense. If petitioner were correct in its argument, then in the circumstances
stated an order might issue against the seller, but not against the buyer,
because the Commission did not prove that the discriminatory price was not
justified by costs.
CONCLUSION
Under all the circumstances it would seem that the problem pre-
sented to the Federal Trade Commission by the Automatic Canteen case
cannot be solved by simply joining the buyer and the seller in the same
proceeding, nor is it likely that the Federal Trade Commission can
solve it by proceeding against the buyer individually and attempting to
prove his knowledge that the price discrimination is not justified by the
seller's costs. The burden of proving the operation of the buyer's mind
is too heavy to assume. Consequently, if anything is to be done to carry
out the original intent and purpose of Section 2 (f) of the Clayton Act,
the law must be amended once more.
Quantity discounts such as those granted by the Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company to Sears-Roebuck led to the passage of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act in 1936, and to the adoption at that time of the rule
that no price discrimination could be granted by the seller, or received
by the buyer which was not justified by cost savings on the part of the
seller.
As the problems involved in the Goodyear case led to the passage
of the Robinson-Patman Act, so may the Automatic Canteen case lead
to the adoption of an amendment to existing law which will shift the
burden of proof to the buyer in a 2 (f) proceeding, to justify the price
discrimination, upon the mere proof by the Federal Trade Commission
that the buyer has been favored with a lower price than his competitor
for goods of like quality.
